Abstract-This paper examines an unintended response to the one-child policy in China: births of twins. Analysis of population census data shows that the one-child policy has accounted for more than one-third of the increase in the reported births of twins since the 1970s. Investigation using birth spacing with prior births and height difference within twins suggests that the increase in the birth of twins is partly due to parents reporting regularly spaced children as twins to avoid the policy violation punishment. The study highlights the possibility of individual behavioral response to undesirable government policies and the potential social consequences.
I. Introduction
S INCE Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a, 1980b) , an established strand of the economics literature has used samples of twins to deal with biases from unobserved factors, particularly in estimating educational returns and the effects of family size (Ashenfelter & Krueger, 1994) . This methodology has been further developed and followed by studies in various contexts, including developing countries such as China (Li, Zhang, & Zhu, 2008; Rosenzweig & Zhang, 2009) .
Previous studies generally assume that twins are born randomly across the population conditional on observed biological factors, such as the mother's age at childbirth and ethnicity. But the studies do not consider the possibility that the birth of twins, as a fertility behavior, could be manipulated in response to the distorted incentives imposed by relevant policies. For the first time, our paper investigates the impact of fertility policy on births of twins to examine the behavioral responses to the distorted incentives of the one-child policy (OCP) in China.
At first glance, the timing of OCP and the trend in the rate of twin births suggest a strong correlation between them (figure 1): the rate of twin births reported in population censuses more than doubled between the late 1960s and the early 2000s, from 3.5 to 7.5 per 1,000 births. The rate of increase in twin births was greater after 1979, when OCP was fully implemented. 1 There is reason to believe that the correlation may not be accidental. When a couple is allowed one birth, the only legitimate way to have two children is to give birth to twins, which is supposedly out of the control of the couple. One option for achieving this goal is to take fertility drugs. Although fertility drugs are meant to be used for infertility by inducing ovulation, there is some anecdotal evidence that women sometimes intentionally take fertility drugs to conceive twins. 2 For those who fail to have twins, an alternative option is to report fake twins, that is, to register two consecutive siblings as twins. For example, officials in Yunnan province identified 700 pairs of fake twins in 342 villages in 2000. More surprising, among 23 pairs of twins reportedly born in 1999, 18 were identified as fake. 3 Using the timing and geographical variation of policy violation fines, we find that the policy accounts for at least one-third of the increase in twin births since the 1970s. Such policy-associated twins are more likely to be found in rural areas and in observed second births. 4 The results are robust to a set of alternative regression specifications.
After getting evidence consistent with the hypothesis of man-made twins, we further investigate the mechanism through which this happens-whether they get twins by measures like reporting fake twins. We find that the birth gap between the first birth and the observed second twin birth is 0.08 year longer relative to an observed second single delivery after the policy was introduced. We also find that height difference within twins is larger where the OCP fine rate is higher. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that OCP incentivizes parents to report nontwin children as twins.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II provides background on China's OCP. Section III describes the data and the empirical results. Section IV explores the potential measures that people take to have twins. Section V concludes with a discussion of the findings, policy implications, and suggestions for further research.
II. Background
OCP was introduced in 1979 to alleviate social, economic, and environmental problems in China (Greenhalgh, 1986; Greenhalgh & Bongaarts, 1992; Wang, 2012) . Legal measures, such as monetary penalties and subsidies, have ensured the effective enforcement of OCP since 1979. Because of the heterogeneous regional development across China, Central Party Committee Document 7 devolved responsibility from the central government to local and provincial governments. The devolution allowed for regional variation in family planning policies, such as the amounts for monetary penalties or subsidies (Greenhalgh, 1986) . However, OCP mainly focused on the Han ethnicity, the largest ethnic group in China, with more than 90% of the population.
In addition to the timing of its implementation, the additional measure of OCP in this study is the average monetary penalty for one unauthorized birth in the province-year panel from 1979 to 2000. 5 The OCP regulatory fine (policy fine) is formulated in multiples of annual income (Ebenstein, 2010; Wei & Zhang, 2011). 6 Since human gestation is approximately nine months, parents' decision to have a child should be made close to a year in advance. For each birth, we construct a variable, policy fine rate, which is the weighted mean value of the rate of the fine in the twelve months before the pregnancy in a given province.
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The effective rate was 0 for children born before 1979, when OCP started. We drop the children born after 2001, because the rate of the fine is not available after 2000. Table A1 presents the summary statistics: the rate of twin births is 0.58% for Han (the majority) and 0.44% for minorities.
III. Data and Empirical Results

A. Data
The main data used in this study are from the 1982, 1990 , and 2000 Population Censuses and the 2005 One-Percent Population Survey. A detailed description of the data and sample restrictions is provided in appendix A. Twins are defined as children in the same household with the same birth year and birth month.
8 Observations are at the birth level, so twins are treated as a single observation, because they are in the same observed birth.
B. Impact of OCP on Twinning Rates in China
To evaluate the effects of OCP on the twinning rate, we estimate the following equation:
where the dependent variable, Twin ijky , denotes whether birth i in year y and province j is a twin birth in survey year k. Fine jym is the OCP fine rate defined above in province j for children born in year y and month m. The main coefficient of interest, b, gives the association of the OCP fine with the reported twinning rate and is interpreted as the impact of OCP. d k , d y , and d ky are indicators for year of birth y, survey year k, and their combinations, respectively. d j denote the province dummies. X ij is a set of covariates, including dummies for residence type (urban/rural), parents' ethnicity (both Han or either a minority), birth order, birth month, mother's education level, and mother's age at childbirth, as well as provincial specific linear trends in birth cohorts.
The first three columns in table 1 report the OLS estimates for b in equation (1) with standard errors clustered at the provincial level. The results indicate that an increase equivalent to one year's income in the policy fine is associated with a 0.066 percentage point increase in the twin birthrate among the whole sample. The estimates in column 2 suggest that 36% of the increase in twins in the Han ethnicity sample can be attributed to OCP.
9 As expected, the FIGURE 1.-TWINNING BIRTH RATE AGAINST YEAR OF BIRTH, 1965 -2005 Data are from the 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2005 Censuses. Twinning rates in each birth cohort are plotted against year of birth. The vertical dashed line marks 1979, when the one-child policy was formally introduced.
5 Details on the construction of this variable can be found in Ebenstein (2010) .
6 Appendix A provides the details. 7 Because the 1982 Census does not have birth month information, we assume the children surveyed in 1982 were born in June and conduct the same procedure. The estimates do not rely on the OCP measure we constructed here: results are consistent if we simply use the rate of fines one year before the child was born. (The results are available on request.) When matching the policy fine rate to the current local province, we assume that the province of birth is the province of current residency, which may not be true due to migration. Using census data after 1990 with information on place of birth, we found that over 95% of the children live in the same province where they were born, indicating that interprovincial migration should not be a big issue of concern in the analysis. 8 Because the 1982 Census data do not have information on birth month, we define twins in that year as children born in the same household with the same birth year. The results are almost the same when we drop the 1982 Census or define twins using only the year of birth in all the other data sets. 9 The twinning rates before and after OCP are 0.39% and 0.67%, respectively. The mean value of the fine rate increases from 0 to 1.4 years of local household income. The part of the increase in the twinning rate that can be explained is 0.072Â1.4/0.28 ¼ 0.36. association and significance survive in the sample for Han ethnicity but diminish in the sample for minority groups.
We further interact the policy fine with Han ethnicity and report the results in column 4. Consistent with the above, the main effect of the fine diminishes, and the interaction is positive and significant, with similar magnitude as in column 2. Li, Yi, and Zhang (2011) argue that spatial and temporal variation of the OCP policy may be endogenous. They find that the policy fine increases with community wealth and the local government's birth control incentives and decreases with the local government's revenue incentives. We test the endogeneity of the fine rate in appendix B and find no evidence of endogeneity under the settings of this paper. Therefore, we conduct another set of regressions without using the policy fine rate, exploring only the timing of OCP:
where Policy t ! 1980 denotes an indicator of whether birth i was in 1980 or after and Han i is an indicator for Han ethnicity of both parents. This difference-in-differences (DID) estimate in the final column of table 1 indicates that OCP explains over 54% of the increase in twins, which is larger than that from estimates based on the policy fine rate. 10 The result is reasonable, since the policy fine captures only one means of punishment and the fine rate is averaged at the provincial level, which may miss some contributing variation within a province.
An important assumption of the DID estimation is that the trend for Han ethnicity without the policy would be similar to that for the minority group. Figure 2 examines this assumption by plotting the twin birthrate by the ethnicity group of the parents against the year of birth. As the figure shows, the trends in the two groups are almost identical prior to the introduction of OCP, indicating that the two trends without the policy are likely to be the same. Enforcement of OCP differs in urban and rural areas. For example, urban areas strictly enforce the policy, while many rural areas allow a couple to have a second child if the first is a girl. This varying enforcement, together with other potential differences between the two areas, may result in heterogeneous effects.
The regression results by residence are reported in table 2. The policy fine is positively correlated with the incidence of twins in urban and rural areas. The association in rural areas is larger and more significant, indicating that the incentive to have twins in rural areas may dominate that in urban areas.
The incentive to have a twin birth may be stronger at different points in the two areas: urban parents may have to manipulate the birth date for the first child, while rural parents can wait until the second. We examine this heterogeneity by interacting policy fines with birth order dummies in The dependent variable is whether the birth is twins or not (yes ¼ 100). The data are from the 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2005 Censuses. Coefficients should be interpreted in percentages because the dependent variables in all columns have been multiplied by 100. Covariates include dummies for residency type, province, birth order, mother's education level, mother's age at birth, year of birth, survey year, and interactions between year of birth and survey year. The parents' ethnicity dummy is controlled for in columns 1, 4, and 5. Sampling weights are applied. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the provincial level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. FIGURE 2.-TWINNING RATE AGAINST YEAR OF BIRTH, BY ETHNICITY, 1965 -2005 The figure plots the twin birthrate by the ethnicity group of the parents against the year of birth. The dashed lines plot LOWESS-smoothed trends with bandwidth 0.8. The figure shows that the trends in the two groups are almost identical prior to the introduction of the one-child policy. However, the difference between Han and minority ethnicity increases after the introduction of the one-child policy in 1979 (the vertical dashed line). The increased difference is partly because the one-child policy mainly restricts the fertility of families of Han ethnicity rather than minorities, which motivates the Han to ''make'' twins. the regressions. As shown in panel B of table 2, twins in the second birth are the most policy relevant, and the association is mainly reflected in rural areas, which is consistent with OCP enforcement.
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IV. Mechanisms: Reporting Fake Twins or Taking Fertility Drugs
People may either report single children as twins ex post or take fertility drugs ex ante to raise the probability of multiple children in a single birth. In this section, we try to identify the two channels by examining the birth gap between the first two observed births and the height difference within twins, respectively.
A. Impact of OCP on Birth Gap between the First Two Observed Births
If an elder child is registered with a younger one as twins, the birthdate of the reported twins tends to be registered as that of the younger child, since the parents have to wait until both children are born. If fake twins are reported to be born as observed second births, there should be a longer birth gap between the first two observed births because it is actually the gap between the first birth and the actual third birth. If parents plan to have twins by taking fertility drugs, however, there is no reason that they would report a delivery date that is later than normal. Therefore, we restrict the sample to the observed second births and conduct the following regressions:
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In equation (3), the variable Birth Gap i denotes the observed birth gap between the current (second) and previous (first) delivery for birth i. Twins i denotes whether the current birth of the same parents for birth i is a twin birth, which captures the potential difference, if any, in the birth gap between single births and twin births driven by factors other than OCP. The coefficient, b 3 , on the interaction term is of central interest because it reflects how much additional time is needed to give birth to twins than to a single child after OCP was implemented. If there are reported fake twins in the observed second births after OCP, we should expect the estimated coefficients for b 3 to be positive because the birth gap between the first and second observed births would be lengthened by a report of fake twins.
The covariates d k , d y , d ky , and d j have the same definitions as before. X 0 i includes dummies for residence type, parents' ethnicity, mother's education level, and mother's age at first childbirth, as well as the provincial-specific linear trends in birth cohorts. Table 3 reports the OLS estimates for b 3 and b 0 3 for different samples. For the full sample (column 1), we obtain a positive and significant estimate for b 3 , showing that a twin birth needs an additional 0.08 year to achieve than a singleton birth does after the OCP was introduced. The next two columns provide results for Han ethnicity and minorities, respectively, and the significant estimates appear only in Han ethnicity.
B. Impact of OCP on Height Difference within Twins
In this section, we use height differences of the two children within a twin birth to test whether they are ''man-made.'' We do the test for same-gender twins and mixed-gender twins, as the results of each have different implications. The The dependent variable is whether the birth is twins or not (yes ¼ 100). The data are from the 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2005 Censuses. Column 1 restricts the sample to births with parents of Han ethnicity; columns 2 and 3 further divide the sample into urban and rural subsamples. Coefficients should be interpreted in percentages because the dependent variables in all columns have been multiplied by 100. Covariates include dummies for residency type, parents' ethnicity, province, birth order, mother's age at birth, year of birth, survey year, and interactions between year of birth and survey year. Sampling weights are applied. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the provincial level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
11 Note again that the second birth here may not be the real second birth, because fake twins may be reported. As discussed in section IV, parents might report the second and third births together as twins, who are misleadingly seen as second births.
12 It is possible that parents have twins in the first observed birth. We do not consider this case here, because it is not possible to calculate the gap between the first observed birth and the previous one, and the results in the previous section suggest that policy-related twinning is mostly concentrated in observed second births. detailed derivations are in appendix C. Here we summarize some basic results from the derivation: (a) if OCP is not relevant for twin births, the height difference within twins should be uncorrelated with the policy; (b) if OCP leads to more fertility drug use rather than reporting fake twins, a larger height difference is predicated to exist only within same-gender twins under OCP; and (c) if there are any reported fake twins, a larger height difference is expected within both same-gender twins and differentgender twins.
For this analysis, we turn to the data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), which provides information on height. We try to use the same definition of twins as that of the census data in the above analyses. A detailed description of the data and sample restrictions is in appendix A. To estimate the relationship between height difference and OCP, we conduct the following estimation:
where the dependent variable, HD ijyk denotes the height difference within twin pair i in province j born in year y of wave k. The coefficient b 4 gives the association between the policy fine and the height difference within twins. Because there are only 72 pairs of twins observed in total and 33 different pairs in the regressions, we combine the birth years into four groups (every five years as one group), d y , to capture the birth year effects. We also combine the neighboring provinces into five groups and control for the region fixed-effects d j . The other covariates, Z i , include indicators for whether the twins are same-gender twins, urban residence, whether the boy within different-gender twins is taller than the girl, and continuous variables like average height of pair i, mother's age at childbirth, and age and age squared of the twins. Panel A in table 4 reports the estimates of equation (4) with standard errors clustered at the provincial level. The first column shows that increasing the fine by one year's income is associated with an increase in the height gap of twins by 1.8 centimeters, suggesting that couples may have employed methods to make twins. Interacting the fine variable with the indicator variable of same-and differentgender twins in column 2 shows that the policy fine is positively associated with height differences for both types of twins. Columns 3 and 4 use the gap/mean ratio as the dependent variable, and the results are similar. The dependent variable is the age gap between the first and second births (years). The data are from the 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2005 Censuses. The sample is restricted to second births. Covariates include residency type, province, birth order, mother's education level, mother's age at first birth, year of birth, survey year, and interactions between year of birth and survey year. Sampling weights are applied, and robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the provincial level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The dependent variable for columns 1 and 2 is height difference (cm) and for columns 3 and 4, height difference/mean. The data are from the China Health and Nutrition Survey. The sample consists of twins born between 1979 and 2001. Each observation is derived from one pair of twins. Covariates in all regressions include age and age squared of the twins, mother's age at childbirth, and indicators for same-gender twins, urban residence, whether the boy is taller in different-gender pairs, region, year of birth category, and survey year. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the provincial level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Since CHNS is a panel data set and the same twins may be surveyed in different waves, we alternatively keep observations from only the latest wave for each pair and run the same regressions as above. Panel B in table 4 reports the estimates for the key variables and the results represent the same pattern, with coefficients of larger magnitude than those in panel A. Altogether, the results in this panel provide supportive evidence of parents reporting consecutive children as twins to avoid the policy violation punishment.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
In 1979, the Chinese government launched the one-child policy, which led to hundreds of millions of couples involved in this strict family planning program lasting for more than thirty years. In this paper, we find that an increase in the policy fine of one year's income is associated with an increase in twin births by approximately 0.07 per 1,000 births, indicating that at least one-third of the increase in twins since the 1970s can be explained by OCP. We then examine the heterogeneous effects by residence and find that the impact of the policy is larger in rural areas, where the policy raises the twin birthrate mainly for second births.
Furthermore, we find that since OCP was put into effect, the birth gap between the first two observed births is 0.08 year longer when the observed second birth is a twin than when it is not. In addition, the height difference within twins is positively associated with the policy fine and the association exists in both same-and different-gender twins. These findings support the hypothesis that OCP has incentivized people to have twins by reporting nontwin children as twins.
Since behavior response is related to deadweight loss of social welfare (Hendren, 2013) , the economics literature usually examines individuals' behavioral response to or against government policies. This study builds up the literature by examining people's behavioral response to OCP. Our estimates indicate a sizable behavioral response from Chinese couples. This finding should motivate future studies to examine individuals' behavioral responses to other undesirable public policies and calculate the associated welfare gain or loss, especially in China, the largest developing country. This study also helps to explain the context and background of studies that use data on twins in China. Since couples can intentionally have twin births to bypass OCP, the distribution of reported twins in China may not be random. It is worth noting that the results do not rule out the possibility that women may take fertility drugs to have twins and that the results allude to the importance of carefully screening twins with observable characteristics when analyzing Chinese data sets of twins.
There are some possible limitations in this study, and we leave these issues for future study. First, the evidence for fake twins provided in this paper is suggestive rather than determinant because we cannot observe fake twins directly in our data. Identification of twins would require careful and detailed field surveys. It would be interesting to see how many twins are fake and how these fake twins are distributed across household socioeconomic status. Second, although CHNS is the largest data set we can find for the analysis on height difference, the sample size is too small; therefore, the results are sensitive to model specification, and any attempt to generalize the results should be treated with caution. We hope the issue can be better addressed in the future with a larger data set. Finally, the fine rate measure we use in this study captures only one dimension of OCP. We hope that future studies can explore more comprehensive measures of the policy to test our story and investigate which dimensions of the policy lead to more fake twins.
APPENDIX A Data
A1. Census Data
The data used in this study are from the 1982, 1990, and 2000 population censuses and the 2005 One-Percent Population Survey. All the data sets contain year of birth, region of residence, type of residence (urban/ rural), 13 gender, ethnicity, education, and relation to the household head. The data sets after 1982 also include month of birth. For women older than 15 years old, the data also provide information about their fertility history, including number of children ever born and number of living children.
For the analysis of twin births and family background, we first keep only households with at least one child and with information available for the mother. We restrict the sample to those whose household heads and spouses are their first marriage and further restrict the sample to households with equal numbers of reported living children, children ever born, and children observed in the survey. Doing so ensures that all the children in each household have the same mother observed in the household and that the sample covers the information needed for the children. In case we miss children who have moved from the household, we further drop households with children over age 17 in the survey. We finally drop households where the mother's age at childbirth is either younger than 15 or older than 50, as these subsamples may be too special or may contain recording errors.
14 Table A1 presents the means and standard deviations for the key variables.
A2. CHNS
The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) includes 26,000 individuals in nine provinces that contain approximately 56% of the population of Mainland China. The nine provinces vary substantially in geography, economic development, public resources, and health indicators. Data collection began in 1989 and has been implemented every two to four years since then (Jones- Smith & Popkin, 2010) .
We first keep the children younger than 18 years in CHNS and select out the twins. Twins are defined as the children with exactly the same birth year and birth month within the same household. We define the height difference of each pair as the difference between the taller and the shorter child. Considering that the height gap may change as the children grow, we also introduce another measure, the ratio of the height gap to the mean height of the pair (gap/mean). We match the twin sample with the fine data and drop those born after 2001, as we did for the census sample. After these restrictions, we have 72 pairs, among whom 53 are samegender twins and the rest are different-gender twins. Table A2 reports the summary statistics for the height gap and the gap/mean ratio. The mean height gap is 2.2 centimeters, and the gap/mean ratio is 1.75%. As The data are from the 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2005 Censuses. The sample is restricted to the births before 2001. Standard deviations in parentheses.
13 The 1990 Census does not provide the type of current residence; it provides information on whether the respondents lived in the same place five years ago and what the type of residence was then. Therefore, we combine information from these two variables and construct an indicator for type of current residence. More specifically, we keep the respondents who lived in the same place as five years ago; then we calculate for each area the proportion of urban and rural, respectively, five years ago. The residence type with the higher proportion was used as the proxy for current residence type for all the observations in this area.
14 We also drop data for Tibet.
expected, different-gender twins have a much larger difference in height than same-gender twins (4.65 versus 1.30 cm). Figure A1 shows the pattern of the policy fine from 1980 to 2000 in each province. The figure shows that the fines in the different provinces generally follow different patterns in timing and magnitude. For example, Liaoning province raised the fine from one year's income to five years' imcome in 1992, while Guizhou raised the fine from two to five years of income in 1998 and Hunan from one to two years of income in 1989. The geographical and temporal variation helps us identify the impact of OCP on the reported births of twins in the following empirical analysis.
A3. One-Child Policy Regulatory Fine
APPENDIX B
Endogeneity Tests of the OCP Fine Rates Li et al. (2011) argue that spatial and temporal variation of OCP may be endogenous. They find that the policy fine increases with community wealth and the local government's birth control incentives and decreases with the local government's revenue incentives. In particular, spatial and FIGURE A1.-ONE-CHILD POLICY FINE RATES, BY PROVINCE, 1979 PROVINCE, -2000 This figure plots the average monetary penalty rate for one unauthorized birth from 1979 to 2000 in each province. The data are from Ebenstein (2010) . The one-child policy regulatory fine (policy fine) is formulated in multiples of annual local household income.
temporal variation in OCP may be affected by the local fertility rate, which in turn may correlate with the incidence of twins. To test this possibility, we regress future policy fines on prior twin birthrates and see if the latter has predictive power on the former. If the association is significant, then the endogeneity problem is worthy of concern. More specifically, in each regression, we use whether the observation is a twin birth as the key independent variable and the amount of policy fine required in the next year, three years later, or five years later as the dependent variable, respectively. Because the local government developed the local policies in 1984, the year of Document 7, we kept the post-1980 birth cohorts to check this. As shown in table B1, the rate of twin births does not seem to have any predictive power on the amount of the policy fine over the next one, three, or five years, suggesting that the reverse causality problem may not be serious in this study. Also note that the coefficients are very small, which suggests that the predicted fine rate would become smaller than 0.01 even if the current twining rate had increased from 0 to 10%.
APPENDIX C
The Two Hypotheses and the Derivation of Their Testable Implications
In this appendix, we derive testable implications for two different hypotheses: the real ''man-made'' twins hypothesis and the false twins hypothesis. For simplicity, we use only financial penalties (fines) to measure OCP and assume it equals 1 when a financial penalty policy is established in the local province and 0 otherwise.
C1. Real ''Man-Made'' Twins Hypothesis
The man-made twins hypothesis indicates that individuals are motivated to use technology, such as fertility drugs, to give birth to twins under OCP. Taking fertility drugs should be reasonable, but embryo technologies did not appear in China until the late 1990s. Fertility drugs are usually used to induce ovulation in women with an infertility problem (Rossing et al., 1994) . When a woman takes a fertility drug, the possibility of multiple ovulations, and thus the likelihood of having twins, is raised (Bortolus et al., 1999; Starr, 2008) . Fertility drugs are classified as prescription medicines, but some people may purchase them in certain private hospitals or obtain prescriptions from certain doctors in an illegal way, such as by bribing the doctors.
Under the man-made twins hypothesis, individuals are more likely to take fertility drugs (Take ¼ 1) to have more children and avoid being punished under OCP, that is, Pr(Take ¼ 1| Fine ¼ 1) > Pr(Take ¼ 1| Fine ¼ 0). Taking certain fertility drugs or using technologies increases the probability of giving birth to twins: Pr(Twins ¼ 1| Take ¼ 1) > Pr(Twins ¼ 1| Take ¼ 0). We also assume that conditional on individuals' behaviors (e.g., Take), giving birth to twins is independent of OCP. In addition, the biological function of fertility drugs or embryo technologies is to develop multiple zygotes in the uterus at the same time rather than to stimulate the split of a single fertilized egg into two or more embryos. Thus, these actions only raise the probability of dizygotic (DZ) twins rather than that of monozygotic (MZ) twins, that is,
MZ twins are nearly identical and they are always of the same gender, except in the extreme case when there is a mutation during development. Certain characteristics of MZ twins become more alike as twins age, such as IQ and personality (Segal, 1985) . DZ twins, however, like other siblings, have an extremely small chance of having the same chromosome profile. DZ twins may look very different from each other and may be of different genders or the same gender. In some sense, DZ twins can be viewed as normal siblings who happen to be the same age. Therefore, we have Pr(
Because of genetic disparity, DZ twins tend to have more differences than MZ ones as they grow up, including differences in height (Fischbein, 1977; Smith et al., 1973) , weight (Stunkard, Foch, & Hrubec, 1986) , mental ability profiles (Segal, 1985) , bone mass (Smith et al., 1973) , and others. Specifically, Fischbein (1977) found that MZ twins have a significantly higher concordance in height than for DZ pairs during puberty, for both boys and girls, and yearly height increments are also more similar for MZ pairs, indicating that the height spurt occurs more simultaneously for MZ twins in comparison with DZ twins. Therefore, the height difference (HD) within a DZ (same-gender) pair should be larger than that of an MZ pair if other factors are equalized, that is,
In addition, we assume that the actions people take do not influence twins' height differences conditional on the twins' type (MZ or DZ). Based on these facts and assumptions, it can be shown that
Equation (C1) states that the height difference within twins should be larger with OCP than without, as there will be more DZ twins because of the fertility-stimulating activities parents undertake in response to OCP. Further, because these activities raise the proportion of DZ twins in samegender twins, the height difference in this group will become larger (equation [C2]). The height difference in the different-gender twins will not change because they are DZ anyway (equation [C3] ). These results provide a way to test whether a woman took measures (e.g., fertility drugs) to stimulate the birth of twins, which we do not observe directly in the data.
C2. Reporting False Twins Hypothesis
The false twins hypothesis is that parents report nontwin children as twins to avoid punishment under OCP. This was feasible because of the following special circumstances earlier in China. First, many women gave birth at home in the 1980s, and it was easy for parents to hide births if they intended to do so. Second, birth certificates were not launched until 1997, and children's birthdates were easy to manipulate before that. Third, children, especially siblings, look alike, in particular when the age difference is not large, which made it possible to report them as twins.
Under the false twins hypothesis, OCP stimulates people's incentives to report false twins, that is, Pr(Twins*|Fine ¼ 1)>Pr(Twins*|Fine ¼ 0), in which Twins* denotes the observed twins, including real ones and false ones. For real twins (Twins), we assume all of them are reported, that is, Pr(Twins*|Twins) ¼ 1.
The most important difference between false twins and true twins is the age of the children. Because of the age difference, the height difference within false twins should be larger, so E(HD|Twins*)>E(HD|Twins) if Pr(Twins|Twins*) < 1.
The condition Pr(Twins|Twins*) < 1 ensures that false twins do exist. If parents have a strong preference for children and do not care about the gender, then the gender composition of false twins should be random, so The dependent variable the one-child policy fine rate in years of local household income. The data are from the 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2005 Censuses. Post-1980 births are used because the one-child policy fine started in 1979 and provincial governments started to have local policies in 1984. Microlevel data are used to test whether contemporaneous twin births in local provinces have predictive power on the fine rates in the future by regressing the fine rates in the next one, three, or five years on the indicator of twinning in the birth-level data, respectively, in columns 1, 2, and 3. The control variables in all columns are the same as those in column 1 of table 1. They include continuous variables, such as the provincial time trend, and indicator variables, such as residency type, parents' ethnicity, province, birth order, mother's age at first birth, year of birth, survey year, and interactions between year of birth and survey year. Sampling weights are applied. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the provincial level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. that height differences in (observed) same-gender twins and differentgender twins should be larger under OCP. However, if parents have a strong boy preference, they are more likely to construct different-gender twins because they have less incentive to make false twins when they had a boy already. No matter which case it is, under the false twins hypothesis, we must have
E HDjTwins
Ã ; Fine ¼ 1 ð Þ > E HDjTwins Ã ; Fine ¼ 0 ð Þ ;(C4)
E HDjDG
in which DG* denotes the observed different-gender twins. As before, equations (C4) and (C5) are based on observables, so they can be tested with empirical analysis. In summary, from the derivations above, we reach the following testable results: (a) if OCP is not relevant for twin births, the height difference within twins should be uncorrelated with the policy; (b) if OCP leads to more fertility drug use rather than reporting false twins, we are likely to see a larger height difference only in same-gender twins under OCP; and (c) if there are any reported false twins, a larger height difference is expected in both same-sex and different-sex twins under OCP.
